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Abstract. We investigate the relationships of the VIX with US and BRIC 
markets. In detail, we pick up the analysis from the point left off by (Sarwar, 
2012), and we focus on the period: Jan 2007 - Feb 2018, thus capturing the 
relations before, during and after the 2008 financial crisis. Results pinpoint 
frequent structural breaks in the VIX and suggest an enhancement around 2008 
of the fear transmission in response to negative market moves; largely depending 
on overlaps in trading hours, this has become even stronger post-crisis for the 
US, while for BRIC countries has gone back towards pre-crisis levels. 
 
Keywords: VIX, BRIC, Fear Index, Structural Breaks, GMM Estimation. 
JEL classification: G15; G11. 
 
1 Introduction 
Since its inception, the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) represents a quick and important 
measure of market sentiment (Whaley, 2000) as it gives an immediate snapshot of 
market expectations of near-term (next 30 calendar days) volatility conveyed by the 
S&P500 stock index option prices. The appellation of “fear index”, is due to how the 
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VIX reacts to market fluctuations, as the VIX works better in capturing market 
downtrends. This is because the weighted blend of Call and Put options forming it is 
mostly used to hedge against market drawdowns (Whaley, 2009), so that the VIX 
mirrors the investors’ demand for hedging and highlights the rise in this demand.  
     The role of VIX as natural barometer for the riskiness of financial markets has been 
widely assessed and described in the literature, mainly with a focus on the relationships 
with the US equity market. In the seminal work of (Fleming et al., 1995), a multivariate 
regression model investigates the intertemporal relationships between VIX and 
S&P100 index1 at various lags and leads. Major findings include: (i) the role of VIX as 
a fear gauge since it exhibits a statistically significant inverse relationship with the US 
equity index; (ii) the asymmetry of VIX in representing the impact of positive and 
negative US equity index returns. Besides, (Whaley, 2000) describes the behavior of 
VIX during US equity market turmoil, identifying a kind of alert threshold (30%) that 
separates high from low volatility periods. Nevertheless, (Whaley, 2009) dampen the 
role of this threshold, and highlights how the capability of VIX in reflecting the current 
state of the economy should be accompanied by a deepest analysis of past conditions 
affecting the market. (Sarwar, 2012a) extends the analysis in (Fleming et al., 1995) 
investigating the relationships among the VIX and three US indexes, namely the 
S&P100, the S&P500 and the S&P600, during the period 1992-2011. Results are 
aligned with previous studies, and underline a negative simultaneous relationship, 
which tend to increase during more volatile periods and to decrease elsewhere. The role 
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of VIX as a fear gauge for the S&P500 index has been also discussed in (Chiang, 2012) 
who discovers an asymmetric response of the VIX to negative returns using a bivariate 
GARCH model with TAR (Threshold Auto-Regression) in the period 2001-2011.  
     Cross-country and spillover effects between VIX and foreign equity markets have 
been also discussed in various works. (Sarwar, 2012b) applies the (Fleming et al., 1995) 
model for testing VIX interactions with BRIC countries in the period 1993-2007. 
Results underline that VIX is a fear gauge for China and Brazil during the whole period, 
and for India during the sub-period 1993-1997. A similar investigation is carried on for 
six European countries in the 1998-2013 timeframe (Sarwar, 2014), confirming the role 
of VIX as a cross-market fear measure. Furthermore, (Sarwar and Khan, 2017) find 
evidence of strong connections among VIX spikes and abrupt drawdowns in a bunch 
of Latin America indexes in the period 2003-2014, thus assessing the role of fear gauge 
of VIX also for Latin America countries.  
     From previous rows, however, an open question pertains the role played by the VIX 
for US and BRIC markets before, during and after a financial crisis. Focusing in the 
period: Jan 2007 – Feb 2018, this work is aimed to fill in this gap, because not only it 
includes the 2008 financial crisis, but also it embraces one of the highest high (80.86, 
20 Nov 2008) and one of the lowest low (9.14, 3 Nov 2017) ever observed in the history 
of the index.  
     Our goals and results go towards at least two directions. First, we aim at shedding 
some lights on the statistical representation of VIX with a focus on changes in regimes. 
In particular, we provide evidence of four structural breaks in the VIX mean level: this 
allows us to distinct the VIX impact before, throughout, after the crisis, and in the six 
years after the post-crisis period (2012-2018). Notably, within this latter period, the 
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VIX reverted in mean at pre-crisis levels between 2012 and 2016, to stabilize at lowest 
levels ever in the period 2016-2018. The results highlight a change in regime almost 
every two years; a big difference in comparison with the period 1993-2007 that 
encompasses only two breaks (Sarwar, 2012b). This behavior poses several questions 
about the VIX as well as the relationships with international stock markets. Second, we 
are interested at checking if and how the fear gauge role of VIX has changed over the 
past decade with respect to the US and the BRIC financial markets. 
     The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is organized into three units, devoted 
to: (i) characterize the data sample; (ii) analyze the VIX in search for (eventual) 
structural breaks; (iii) give summary statistics; Section 3 describes basic features of the 
multivariate regression model employed in the study; Section 4 presents the main 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
2 Data and methods 
 
2.1 Dataset and Trading Time-zones 
We consider the VIX during the period 03/01/2007 – 01/02/2018, for overall number 
of 2791 daily observations. VIX interactions are studied with respect to the following 
indexes: S&P500 (SPX - USA); IBOVESPA (IBOV - Brazil); MOEX (IMOEX - 
Russia); S&P BSE Sensex (BSESN - India); Shanghai c (SHSEC - China). The S&P500 
index is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 stocks representing all major US 
industries. The Brazilian IBOVESPA is a gross total return index of all the most liquid 
stocks traded on the San Paulo Stock Exchange. The S&P BSE Sensex index is a cap-
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weighted index representing at best the Indian industries, with components selected to 
take into account liquidity and industry representation. The Russian MOEX (formerly 
MICEX) index is a cap-weighted index representing the 50 most liquid Russian stocks 
traded on the Moscow exchange. Finally, the Shanghai SHSEC is a capitalization-
weighted index. The index constituents list comprises all A-shares and B-shares listed 
on the Shanghai exchange. 
The VIX and all the other indexes are retrieved from S&P CapitalIQ database2. We use 
the same indexes as in (Sarwar, 2012b), with the exception of Russian IMOEX that 
replaces the AK&M index. The rationale of this substitution resides in considering the 
MOEX more representative of the Russian financial situation than the AK&M which 
is released by a rating agency. We selected only days in which the VIX has been traded, 
due to its central role in this analysis. Moreover, we deal with missing observations by 
filling gaps with linear interpolation of adjacent available observations.  
The peculiar feature of this dataset is that opening and closing hours for trading vary 
for each index: with respect to the UTC time zone, China (SHSEC) opens first and 
closes before the VIX opening time. The same applies for India (BSESN), while Russia 
(IMOEX) and Brazil (IBOV) are the only countries with partially (Russia) or nearly 
(Brazil) overlapping trading windows to the VIX. The VIX and the selected US market 
(SPX) share the same opening and closing times.  
This opening and closing hours setup directly affects the interaction among the VIX 
and BRIC stock indexes: (Sarwar, 2012b), for example, found strong evidence of 
relationships among the VIX and the current value of US, China, India and Brazil 
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indexes, indicating that the relation is always stronger within 24 hours. An index like 
the Chinese SHSEC, that opens before the VIX, however, should not be immediately 
conditioned by this latter, because investors will react to today’s VIX information 
during next market opening. Therefore, an eventual dependence between VIX and 
SHSEC should be captured better by lead parameters, because the SHSEC is ex post 
influenced by the fear index. Indeed, we do not expect the VIX to be influenced by 
emerging markets as BRIC: in this case, however, the relationship should be captured 
by lag values, since the BRIC indexes release information before the VIX opening hour.  
 
 
2.2  A preliminary analysis of VIX in search for structural breaks 
In general, model estimation is a task that can be affected by heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation and multicollinearity in and between the variables under consideration. 
However, the estimation results may be also influenced by not identified structural 
breaks: the presence of structural breaks, in fact, indicates changes in the data 
generating process, so that relationships with other series may consistently vary.  
Already (Guo & Wohart, 2006) provide strong statistical evidence that the VIX 
varies over time with infrequent but significant changes in the mean level: focusing on 
the timeframe Jan 1990-Dec 2003, this study highlighted three regimes: pre-1992, 
1992-1997, and post-1997. Following this track, we run the Bai and Perron test to detect 
structural breaks in the VIX mean level in the period Jan 2007-February 2018. The test 
has been managed in accordance to the remarks found in (Bai and Perron, 2003). In 
detail, we set the trimming parameter to 0.20 to allow for serial correlation and 
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heteroscedasticity in the VIX time series: this means to set the number of maximum 
breaks to five.  
The results were then evaluated according to the rationale explained in next rows. 
First, in Panel A, we verified with the Double Maximum (UDmax) test statistics if it 
was possible to reject the assumption of no breaks; if not, we sequentially tested with 
the F-test statistic the presence of breaks up to the maximum number of five. Second, 
to verify the adequacy of the findings from Panel A, and to select the proper number of 
breaks we built various regression models each considering a number of breaks from 
zero to five, and we reported the result for the best the regression models according to 
the LWZ (Liu et al., 1997) information criterion. Moreover, in line with (Guo and 
Wohar, 2006) we applied the test on the VIX raw as well as on the standardized VIX 
time series. In this latter case, we excluded outliers, i.e. the observations whose absolute 
value exceeds the mean plus three times the standard deviation. Results are summarized 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Bai and Perron test results for VIX and standardized VIX (Std-VIX) time 
series. 
 
Panel A: Bai and Perron Statistics for Tests of Multiple Structural Breaks 
 
 
UDmaxa F(1|0)  
 
F(2|1) F(3|2) F(4|3) F(5|4) 
VIX 20.2190*** 13.7178*** 13.011** 13.3296** 11.6154* - 
Std- VIX 30.2438*** 18.0632*** 17.89*** 18.0081*** 14.5189** - 
Panel B: Bai and Perron Statistics for the model with number of breaks selected with the LWZ criterion 
 
 
LWZ C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
VIX 3.9606 19.8356 33.3202 23.2531 15.8426 12.4655 
  (0.2586)*** (0.6694)*** (0.3290)*** (0.1075)*** (0.1558)*** 
Std-VIX 3.4331 19.7867 28.7888 22.2245 14.4917 16.9668 
  (0.2592)*** (0.2633)*** (0.2411)*** (0.2245)*** (0.2542)*** 
Panel C: Bai and Perron Regime Means, End Dates, and 90% and 95% Confidence Intervals  
 
 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime 5  
VIX 
End Date 12/09/2008 14/06/2010 15/02/2012 24/05/2016 09/02/2018  
95% [03/01/2007; 
09/10/2008] 
[08/02/2010; 
17/09/2015] 
[08/12/2011; 
13/06/2013] 
[11/06/2015; 
21/09/2017] 
  
90% [03/01/2007; 
23/09/2008] 
[14/04/2010; 
27/03/2014] 
[06/01/2012; 
30/01/2013] 
[28/09/2015; 
02/05/2017] 
  
Std-VIX 
End Date 08/09/2008 22/07/2010 07/03/2012 24/06/2016 09/02/2018  
95% [03/01/2007; 
18/03/2009] 
[29/05/2009; 
03/02/2015] 
[19/07/2010; 
28/11/2014] 
[14/03/2016; 
14/08/2017] 
  
90% [03/01/2007; 
26/01/2009] 
[28/10/2009; 
18/10/2013] 
[20/09/2011; 
23/10/2014] 
[20/04/2016; 
19/04/2017] 
  
 
Table 1 must be read as follows: Panel A contains the Bai and Perron statistics testing 
for multiple structural breaks. From left to right, we listed: the UDmax test statistic 
(with null hypothesis of no breaks versus the alternative hypothesis of presence of at 
least one break); the test statistics checking for one break against zero -F(1|0)-, two 
breaks against one -F(2|1)-, and so on until testing five breaks against four -F(5|4). Panel 
B contains the Bai and Perron statistics for the test run on the regression model selected 
with the LWZ information criterion. Finally, Panel C reports the test conclusive results, 
9 
with initial and final days for each regime, the corresponding 90% and 95% confidence 
intervals and the regime mean. For each Panel, results are provided for both the VIX 
and standardized VIX time series, listing robust standard errors within brackets; here 
the significance level is: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*.  
     Results underpin the presence of four structural breaks, and five regimes at the mean 
level in total. We were able to link those structural breaks with four major events that 
can explain the change in the regime that is, in chronological order: the 2008 global 
financial crisis; the 2010 European Sovereign debt crisis triggered by the Greek 
situation; the 2012 end of uncertainty in the European markets due to new expansionary 
monetary policies; the 2016 Brexit and related uncertainty period. We were therefore 
able to highlight five regimes within the available sample of 2791 observations: Regime 
1 starting in Jan:2007 and ending in Sept:2008 (419 obs.); Regime 2 starting in 
Sept:2008 and ending in Jul:2010 (463 obs.); Regime 3 starting in Jul:2010 and ending 
in March:2012 (422 obs.); Regime 4 starting in March:2012 and ending in June:2016 
(1072 obs.); Regime 5 starting in June:2016 and ending in Feb:2017 (414 obs.). Regime 
1 and 4 can be viewed as periods of “regular” volatility, Regime 2 and 3 are high 
volatility periods while Regime 5 is the sole low volatility period. Figure 1 provides a 
visual illustration: the VIX time series (in blue) was divided into five bands whose 
amplitude relates to the regimes length and bound corresponding to the events 
determining the breaks.  
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Figure 1: The VIX time series with highlighted structural breaks: values are percentage 
points standing for the expected range of movement in the S&P 500 index over the next 
year, at a 68% confidence level (i.e. one standard deviation of the normal probability 
curve). On the x-axis integer values correspond to days in the range: 3 Jan 2007 (t=0)-
1 February 2018 (t=2791).  
 
During the period of interest for this work (Jan 2007 – Feb 2018), the VIX behavior 
seemed to have been pulled at the extremes more than as previously observed: this is 
mostly due to the presence in our sample of the 2008 financial crisis; however, also 
including one of the highest high (80.86, 20 Nov 2008) and one of the lowest low (9.14, 
3 Nov 2017) of VIX whole history played an important role. Following (Whaley, 2000), 
we try to assess this evidence in a more quantitative way by looking at median and 
percentile ranges for daily closing VIX levels, in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Median and percentile ranges for daily closing VIX levels. 
  Percentile Normal Ranges 
Year Obs. 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 50% 90% 
Full 2797 10.614 11.680 13.488 17.010 22.963 30.664 39.934 9.475 29.320 
Regime 1 419 10.754 12.288 14.935 20.410 23.818 26.348 27.780 8.883 17.027 
Regime 2 463 17.522 18.808 23.065 28.580 41.938 53.680 62.928 18.873 45.406 
Regime 3 422 15.950 16.511 17.950 20.800 25.710 33.128 36.946 7.760 20.996 
Regime 4 1072 12.071 12.477 13.400 14.850 17.085 20.536 23.078 3.685 11.007 
Regime 5 414 9.598 9.870 10.458 11.660 13.190 15.580 18.398 2.733 8.800 
 
Looking at Table 2, for the whole sample (first row, with the label “Full”) and for each 
regime under examination, we report the number of observations, seven percentiles in 
ascendant order from 5% to 95%, and two Normal ranges: the 50% (90%) one is 
obtained by subtracting the 25% (95%) percentile from the 75% (5%) percentile. The 
50% percentile is the median VIX closing value: for the full sample it is at 17.01%, i.e. 
the VIX, with a probability of 0.5, for the next year should maintain between 13.48% 
and 22.96%. However, as highlighted in (Whaley, 2009) these results are meaningless 
if not compared with historical values. To such aim, we made two comparisons. First, 
we compared our findings with those in (Whaley, 2000), who examined the VIX in the 
period 1986-1999. Whaley’s sample includes a financial crisis (1987) and a market 
mini-crash (1989), so we expect to find in our samples quite similar median and 
percentile ranges. To support this assertion, we may observe that in the period studied 
by Whaley the VIX has a median value of 17.30%, with the probability of 50% of lying 
in the range 12.97% - 23.04%; these values are very close to those examined in our 
case. Nevertheless, when moving to Normal ranges (in the latest right-hand columns of 
Table 2), the two data samples show distinctive features. In particular, the 2008 
financial crisis is clearly more volatile than the 1987 turmoil analyzed by Whaley: for 
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the 1987 event, the 50% and 90% Normal ranges were 6.13% and 38.45%, respectively; 
during the 2008 event, on the other hand, the corresponding Normal ranges are: 18.87% 
and 45.40%. Second, we compared our results with those in (Sarwar, 2012b) who 
focused on the relations between the VIX and BRIC markets indexes, but in a different 
period. Sarwar’s sample goes from 1993 to 2007, and includes the markets fall due to 
9/11 facts. However, the features diversity among the samples is stated in the number 
of structural breaks: two in the Sarwar’s case against a break every 2 year on average, 
in our sample.  
 
 
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
     We are now going to provide descriptive statistics for the time series analyzed in the 
paper: relevant values are highlighted in Table 3 for VIX, the changes in VIX (cVIX 
thereinafter) as well as US and BRIC stock index returns; statistics are reported for both 
the whole observation period and for all the identified regimes. The cVIX values are 
scaled by a factor of 100.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for VIX, cVIX, the US and BRIC stock market 
indexes. For the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, test statistics with significance 
are reported. 
 
Variable Mean StdDev Min Max 𝝆(𝟏) 𝝆(𝟐) 𝝆(𝟑) ADF test 
Full Period – 2007-2018     
VIX 19.7806 9.6665 9.1400 80.8600 0.9807 0.9663 0.9546 -2.2586* 
cVIX 0.0000 0.0189 -0.1736 0.1654 0.9807 0.9663 0.9546 -60.0143*** 
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SPX 0.0002 0.0126 -0.0947 0.1096 -0.1045 -0.0556 0.0360 -58.5676*** 
IBOV 0.0002 0.0172 -0.1412 0.1368 -0.0067 -0.0213 -0.0363 -53.1141*** 
IMOEX 0.0001 0.0203 -0.2066 0.2523 -0.0018 0.0098 -0.0324 -52.8806*** 
BSESN 0.0003 0.0139 -0.1160 0.1599 0.0901 -0.0278 -0.0210 -48.1870*** 
SHSEC 0.0001 0.0167 -0.0967 0.0903 0.0021 0.0059 0.0423 -52.6678*** 
Regime 1 – 2007-2008     
VIX 19.7580 5.3622 9.8900 32.2400 0.9548 0.9294 0.9074 -0.5211 
cVIX 0.0003 0.0157 -0.0699 0.0716 0.9548 0.9294 0.9074 -25.9467*** 
SPX -0.0003 0.0116 -0.0353 0.0415 -0.1609 -0.0015 -0.0345 -23.9978*** 
IBOV 0.0005 0.0175 -0.0686 0.0614 -0.0321 0.0294 -0.0563 -21.0783*** 
IMOEX -0.0007 0.0183 -0.1296 0.0564 -0.0969 -0.0090 0.0772 -22.4771*** 
BSESN 0.0001 0.0187 -0.0776 0.0641 0.0721 0.0319 -0.0516 -18.9525*** 
SHSEC -0.0004 0.0246 -0.0967 0.0889 -0.0522 -0.0037 0.1304 -21.4919*** 
Regime 2 – 2008-2010     
VIX 32.9862 13.7895 15.5800 80.8600 0.9724 0.9518 0.9394 -0.8747 
cVIX 0.0000 0.0320 -0.1736 0.1654 0.9724 0.9518 0.9394 -24.4204*** 
SPX -0.0003 0.0225 -0.0947 0.1096 -0.1255 -0.1262 0.1186 -24.3503*** 
IBOV 0.0005 0.0265 -0.1412 0.1368 -0.0037 -0.1066 -0.0418 -21.5482*** 
IMOEX 0.0001 0.0389 -0.2066 0.2523 0.0192 0.0242 -0.0613 -21.0827*** 
BSESN 0.0004 0.0220 -0.1160 0.1599 0.0992 -0.0807 -0.0106 -19.4606*** 
SHSEC 0.0001 0.0198 -0.0698 0.0903 0.0048 0.0235 0.0294 -21.4322*** 
Regime 3 – 2010-2012     
VIX 22.9438 6.7439 14.6200 48.0000 0.9512 0.9210 0.8846 -1.1723 
cVIX -0.0002 0.0207 -0.1294 0.1600 0.9512 0.9210 0.8846 -25.1426*** 
SPX 0.0006 0.0126 -0.0690 0.0463 -0.1083 0.0990 -0.1492 -22.7963*** 
IBOV 0.0001 0.0138 -0.0843 0.0498 -0.0407 0.0653 -0.0542 -21.3226*** 
IMOEX 0.0004 0.0147 -0.0814 0.0407 0.0612 -0.0187 -0.0212 -19.2619*** 
BSESN 0.0000 0.0117 -0.0421 0.0352 0.1015 0.0156 -0.0023 -18.5087*** 
SHSEC 0.0000 0.0120 -0.0529 0.0313 -0.0290 0.0514 -0.0280 -21.0790*** 
Regime 4 – 2012-2016     
VIX 15.8058 3.5255 10.3200 40.7400 0.9276 0.8565 0.7932 -1.4506 
cVIX 0.0000 0.0133 -0.0570 0.1271 0.9276 0.8565 0.7932 -33.0528*** 
SPX 0.0004 0.0083 -0.0402 0.0383 -0.0038 -0.0177 -0.0065 -32.7749*** 
IBOV -0.0002 0.0146 -0.0499 0.0639 0.0284 0.0041 -0.0154 -31.7920*** 
IMOEX 0.0002 0.0133 -0.1142 0.1136 -0.0668 -0.0055 -0.0282 -34.9605*** 
BSESN 0.0004 0.0095 -0.0612 0.0337 0.0875 -0.0147 -0.0217 -29.9089*** 
SHSEC 0.0002 0.0159 -0.0887 0.0604 0.0562 -0.0034 -0.0187 -30.9209*** 
Regime 5 – 2016-2018     
VIX 12.2059 2.4864 9.1400 25.7600 0.9033 0.8245 0.7516 -0.9028 
cVIX 0.0000 0.0109 -0.0510 0.0851 0.9033 0.8245 0.7516 -22.2678*** 
SPX 0.0007 0.0054 -0.0366 0.0220 -0.0684 -0.0346 -0.0693 -21.2633*** 
IBOV 0.0012 0.0126 -0.0921 0.0391 -0.0641 0.0924 -0.0670 -21.4489*** 
IMOEX 0.0004 0.0080 -0.0246 0.0281 0.1883 -0.0333 0.0042 -16.7639*** 
BSESN 0.0007 0.0063 -0.0257 0.0187 0.0872 -0.0534 0.0534 -18.3985*** 
SHSEC 0.0004 0.0062 -0.0250 0.0249 0.0209 -0.0750 0.0430 -19.7341*** 
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For each index we show: Mean, Standard Deviation (StDev), Minimum (Min), 
Maximum (Max), autocorrelations at various lags ((1)-(3)) and the test statistics for 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Results foster the splitting identified by the 
Bai and Perron test in Sec. 2.2. The volatility, in fact, is time-changing: the VIX mean 
value is 19.75% during Regime 1 but moves to 32.98% (due to the 2008 financial crisis) 
during Regime 2 and goes back to the original Regime 1 level in the following years; 
finally, during the last period (Regime 5) it settles to its lowest level. The dualism 
between Regime 2 and Regime 5 is also supported by considering that while in the 
former the VIX reached its highest peak (80.86%), in the latter, the VIX reverted to its 
lowest value ever (9.14%). Finally, most of the series along the full sample and the sub-
samples show a slightly negative autocorrelation. This is in line with the findings of 
(Fleming et al., 1995): the VIX does not exhibit seasonality patterns, while changes in 
VIX are slightly autocorrelated.  
The remarks in previous rows support the decision of using cVIX instead of VIX to 
estimate the intertemporal relationships between the VIX and stock market indexes. 
First, intuitively, changes into expected volatility reflect what investors may be worried 
from. Second, a regression involving raw VIX values and prices would lead to spurious 
estimations: from last column in Table 3, in fact, we can see that while cVIX and index 
returns are stationary, both the VIX and index prices are not.  
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3 Methodology 
Inspired by the works of (Fleming et al., 1995) first and (Sarwar, 2012a,b) after, we 
applied the (Fleming et al., 1995) multivariate regression model to assess the 
intertemporal relationships among the changes in VIX and the stock market returns 
indexes of US and BRIC countries.  
     The model has a long and well-established track in investigating the relationship 
between market indexes and the VIX. Table 4 lists all the works using this model to 
address the VIX fear gauge role. For each work, we showed the dependent and 
independent variables, the countries of interest, the period of analysis and the estimation 
methodology. 
 
 
Table 4: Applications of the (Fleming et al., 1995)’s multivariate regression model to 
assess the fear gauge role of the VIX index. 
 
Reference Dependent Var. Independent Var. Countries Period Est. Method. 
(Fleming et al., 
1995) 
cVIX Stock Index Returns US 1986-1992 GMM 
(Sarwar, 2012a) cVIX Stock Index Returns US 1992-2011 GMM 
(Sarwar, 2012b) cVIX Stock Index Returns US and BRIC 1993-2007 GMM 
(Sarwar, 2014) cVIX Stock Index Returns Europe 1998-2013 GMM 
(Sarwar, 2017) cVIX 
Changes in  
Volatility of T-note and 
precious metals 
US 2004-2014 GMM 
(Sarwar and Khan, 
2017) 
Stock Index Returns cVIX Latin America 2003-2014 GMM 
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With the exclusion of (Sarwar and Khan, 2017), the remaining papers share the same 
aim, as they investigate whether the VIX index is a fear gauge for several stock market 
indexes during different periods. Conversely, (Sarwar and Khan, 2017) examine the 
effects of VIX on Latin America stock market indexes, by swapping the VIX from 
dependent to independent variable. Finally, with respect to the estimation procedure, 
the model always relies on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); this is 
justified by at least two motivations: (i) the autocorrelation in stock market index 
returns; (ii) the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the VIX changes, as noted in 
(Fleming et al., 1995). Indeed, (Fleming et al., 1995) is the only case where the GMM 
is made more robust by considering Parzen weights (Gallant, 1987) for the covariance 
matrix estimation and Andrew’s method of automatic bandwidth selection (Andrews, 
1991). 
     Going back to the model, it allows considering five temporal relationships at once: 
let us denote by t the reference trading time, then t-1 and t-2 identify two lags, while 
t+1 and t+2 indicate two leads. Index returns for each examined market were then 
regressed for any of the above lag and lead against current changes in the VIX value. 
For the generic country s, we therefore have: 
 c𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠,𝑡+𝑖
2
𝑖=−2 𝑅𝑠,𝑡+𝑖 + 𝛽|𝑠|,𝑡   |𝑅𝑠,𝑡| + 𝜀𝑡 . (1) 
Here c𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 is the change in the VIX at time t; 𝛼 is the intercept of the regression, 𝑅𝑠,𝑡+𝑖  
is the index return for the market 𝑠 at time 𝑡 + 𝑖 (i=-2,-1,0, 1,2); |𝑅𝑠,𝑡| is the current 
absolute return and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term. Lags and leads in the model help managing the 
issue of time shift, as VIX and BRIC market indexes are traded at different times.  
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     The richness of existing ties between changes in the VIX and the market indexes is 
fully contained in (1). The model, in fact, captures the simultaneous relationship 
between cVIXt and the s-th market index return through the parameter 𝛽𝑠,𝑡, while 
delayed values, ruled out by the 𝛽𝑠,𝑡+𝑖 (i0), explain both ex-ante and ex-post 
relationships among cVIXt and stock market returns. In general, the fear gauge role of 
the VIX index is assessed when 𝛽𝑠,𝑡+𝑖 (i0) assume negative values: we expect to find 
a kind of inverse relationship: a decrease (rise) in the market index value should be 
accompanied by an increase (decrease) in market expected volatility (Fleming et al., 
1995). 
     The importance of the parameters depends on the number of trading hours shared 
between the VIX index and the country stock index. In fact, when they are fully 
matching (as in the case of S&P500 index), 𝛽𝑠,𝑡 captures almost the whole relationship, 
while lead and lag parameters are close to zero (Fleming et al., 1995, Sarwar, 2012a,b). 
On the contrary, in case of low or even in the absence of overlapping trading hours, 
when the country index closes before (after) VIX opening, the delayed values assume 
greater importance - and a higher value in absolute terms - since they capture a kind of 
backward/forward shift in the VIX effect. Nevertheless, (Sarwar, 2012b) find that the 
relationship between BRIC stock markets index which trade before the VIX closing 
time and cVIXt is well captured by 𝛽𝑠,𝑡 and 𝛽𝑠,𝑡+1. 
     To conclude, we examine the role of  𝛽|𝑠|,𝑡, that is a proxy of market sentiment: when 
negative (positive), the market volatility should equivalently tend to decrease 
(increase). Besides, for i=0, we use 𝛽|𝑠|,𝑡 also to calculate the sums 𝛽𝑠
+ = 𝛽𝑠,𝑡+ 𝛽|𝑠|,𝑡 
and 𝛽𝑠
− = 𝛽𝑠,𝑡− 𝛽|𝑠|,𝑡, which are the contemporaneous responses to positive and 
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negative market shifts and give indications about the eventual asymmetry between 
cVIX t and the stock market returns. In order to evaluate which of them prevail on the 
other, we will compare the corresponding absolute values. 
As final note, we underline that in (1) we only inserted 𝛽|𝑠|,𝑡  without considering any 
lag or lead. This choice obeys basically to two motivations: first, (Fleming et al., 1995; 
Sarwar, 2012a,b) found lag and lead absolute parameters not-significant; second, we 
want to avoid the over-parameterization of the model. 
      
4 Results 
In order to verify whether the VIX index has been a fear gauge for the US and the BRIC 
stock market indexes during the period Jan 2007 – Feb 2018, we start at first by looking 
at the correlation between the cVIX and the intertemporal stock index returns values; 
we will then move to estimate the multivariate regression model. 
     Table 5 lists the correlation between cVIXt and values of indexes returns at various 
lags and leads t+i, (i=-2,-1,0,1,2) for the whole sample (Column 2) as well as for the 
regimes identified in Sec. 2 (Columns 3 to 7).  
 
Table 5: Correlation between cVIXt and indexes returns at time t+i, i = -2,-1,0,1,2. 
 
Correlation Pair Full 2007-2008 2008-2010 2010-2012 2012-2016 2016-2018 
SPX(-2)-cVIX(0) 0.0594*** 0.0281 0.1112** -0.0720 0.0437 0.1159** 
SPX(-1)-cVIX(0) 0.1091*** 0.2015*** 0.1046** 0.1409*** 0.0483 0.0762 
SPX(0)-cVIX(0) -0.8346*** -0.8558*** -0.8421*** -0.8675*** -0.8394*** -0.7762*** 
SPX(+1)-cVIX(0) 0.0949*** 0.1621*** 0.1238*** 0.1508*** -0.0663** 0.0579 
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SPX(+2)-cVIX(0) 0.0684*** -0.0040 0.1656*** -0.0973** 0.0081 0.0516 
IBOV(-2)-cVIX(0) 0.0261*** -0.0610 0.0734 -0.1120** 0.0603** 0.0433 
IBOV(-1)-cVIX(0) 0.0765*** 0.2076*** 0.0852* 0.1393*** -0.0359 0.0572 
IBOV(0)-cVIX(0) -0.5814*** -0.6194*** -0.7319*** -0.6640*** -0.3643*** -0.3453*** 
IBOV(+1)-cVIX(0) -0.0143*** 0.0092 -0.0176 0.0479 -0.0612** -0.0063 
IBOV(+2)-cVIX(0) 0.0438*** -0.0182 0.1098** -0.0295 0.0029 0.0416 
IMOEX(-2)-cVIX(0) 0.0019*** -0.0009 -0.0026 0.0107 -0.0167 0.1196** 
IMOEX(-1)-cVIX(0) 0.0328*** 0.0745 0.0250 0.0697 0.0238 -0.0101 
IMOEX (0)-cVIX(0) -0.3022*** -0.1658*** -0.3422*** -0.4578*** -0.2466*** -0.1529*** 
IMOEX(+1)-cVIX(0) -0.1777*** -0.2307*** -0.2266*** -0.0298 -0.1130*** -0.2223*** 
IMOEX(+2)-cVIX(0) -0.0207*** 0.0283 -0.0226 -0.1227** 0.0122 0.0178 
BSESN(-2)-cVIX(0) 0.0237*** -0.1023** 0.0657 -0.0048 0.0560* 0.0472 
BSESN(-1)-cVIX(0) 0.0570*** 0.1533*** 0.0429 0.0470 0.0548* -0.0484 
BSESN(0)-cVIX(0) -0.2823*** -0.0540 -0.4358*** -0.1602*** -0.2944*** -0.1795*** 
BSESN(+1)-cVIX(0) -0.2287*** -0.3749*** -0.1929*** -0.2326*** -0.2169*** -0.2552*** 
BSESN(+2)-cVIX(0) -0.0182*** -0.0372 0.0176 -0.0623 -0.0661** 0.0073 
SHSEC(-2)-cVIX(0) 0.0031*** -0.0583 0.0111 -0.0123 0.0522* -0.0371 
SHSEC(-1)-cVIX(0) 0.0279*** 0.0308 0.0606 0.0051 0.0108 -0.0131 
SHSEC(0)-cVIX(0) -0.0838*** -0.0039 -0.1193** -0.1055** -0.1362*** 0.0514 
SHSEC(+1)-cVIX(0) -0.1525*** -0.1554*** -0.1576*** -0.1785*** -0.1757*** -0.1935*** 
SHSEC(+2)-cVIX(0) -0.0099*** -0.0337 0.0741 -0.0679 -0.0649** -0.0805* 
 
During the full period (Column 2), the correlation between current index values and 
VIX was negative for all the indexes and always statistical significant. In particular, the 
SPX has the lower value (-0.83); followed in ascendant order by IBOV (-0.58); IMOEX 
(-0.30); BSESN (-0.28) and SHSEC (-0.08). This result is coherent with the shift in 
trading hours highlighted in Section 2: the higher the overlap is, the more 
contemporaneous values are negatively correlated. Moreover, in the whole sample also 
lead and lag values are always significant for all the indexes under consideration. In 
detail, for the SPX the values are negative and sensitively small, thus supporting the 
findings in (Sarwar, 2012b); for BRIC indexes lag values are small and positive, and 
hence denote that past stock returns are not influencing the VIX. On the other hand, 
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lead values are mostly negative and small: the majority of the effect on VIX should be 
therefore explained by indexes contemporaneous values, as observed in (Sarwar, 
2012b). In detail, IBOV, whose trading hours are nearly overlapping to those of VIX, 
shows positive and small value at lead 2 IBOV(+2), as the SPX. The remaining three 
indexes, on the contrary, have negative but small correlation values at lead 2, and 
negative and higher correlation at lead 1, whose magnitude is similar to the 
contemporaneous correlation value. We can therefore state that the VIX effect is 
therefore captured by the contemporaneous correlation values, as well as at lead 1 and, 
weekly at lead 2. 
     Moving to sub-periods, the contemporaneous relation changes from the full period 
case: for the SPX, the correlation has the same magnitude across all the sub-samples 
with the exception of the last one (2016-2018), characterized by a lower level of 
volatility. Again, for SPX, the correlation is always statistically significant at lag 1 as 
well as at lead 1: SPX(+1) and SPX(-1) are positive and small, especially during less 
volatile periods. The remaining lags and leads offer mixed result. We can therefore state 
that during sub-periods, the statistical significance of correlation helps at identifying 
where the relationships lies, i.e. in the current values as well as at lead and lag 1. 
Regarding BRIC indexes, trading time plays a crucial role in determining when the 
correlation is stronger. In detail, the IBOV, which is the index with the highest 
overlapping in trading hours with VIX, shows most relevant correlation value at time t, 
with small values elsewhere. BSESN, IMOEX and SHSEC, on the other hand, show 
most significant correlation at lead t+1; nevertheless, correlation at time t is still 
negative. In conclusion, the correlation between BRIC indexes and cVIX (with the 
IBOV as exception) lies mainly in the index values at both time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, with 
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significant and generally negative values, while lagged correlations are small and 
mostly not statistically significant. Correlation is stronger during the 2008 financial 
crisis, while it is softened during more recent periods, and especially in the latest one. 
     We are now ready to apply the multivariate regression model: Table 6 shows the 
intertemporal relationships for the US and BRIC stock markets estimated with (1) 
through the GMM procedure. The columns report the values for estimated parameters:  
?̂?𝑠,𝑡+𝑖 (with i=-2,-1,0,1,2),  ?̂?|𝑠|,𝑡, ?̂?𝑠
− and ?̂?𝑠
+, whose meaning has been already 
explained in Sec. 3. Standard errors are within rounded brackets and all significant at 
99% confidence level, therefore we omitted to mark them by the conventionally used 
*** notation. 
 
Table 6: Intertemporal relationships for the US and BRIC stock markets. 
 
Period Intercept ?̂?𝒔,𝒕−𝟐 ?̂?𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 ?̂?𝒔,𝒕 ?̂?𝒔,𝒕+𝟏 ?̂?𝒔,𝒕+𝟐 ?̂?|𝒔|,𝒕 ?̂?𝒔
+ ?̂?𝒔
− 
Panel A: S&P500 
FULL -0.0007 0.0324 0.0571 -1.2406 0.0115 0.0332 0.1231 1.1175 1.3637 
 (-1.9570) (0.9109) (1.8867) (-22.5757) (0.3256) (0.8744) (2.6079)   
07-08 -0.0008 0.0636 0.1011 -1.1261 0.0370 -0.0147 0.0969 1.0291 1.2230 
 (-1.3552) (1.4375) (2.5713) (-17.9311) (1.1666) (-0.3791) (1.2543)   
08-10 -0.0019 0.0103 0.0095 -1.1700 0.0367 0.0966 0.1097 1.0603 1.2796 
 (-1.7129) (0.1956) (0.2032) (-13.7895) (0.6863) (1.7589) (1.5140)   
10-12 -0.0021 0.0808 0.1098 -1.3854 0.0851 -0.0054 0.2952 1.0902 1.6806 
 (-2.9990) (2.4521) (2.1495) (-13.6190) (1.4024) (-0.1106) (4.4734)   
12-16 -0.0009 0.0711 0.0915 -1.3447 -0.1095 -0.0074 0.2260 1.1188 1.5707 
 (-1.9828) (2.1803) (3.0278) (-21.6796) (-1.5105) (-0.2383) (2.7295)   
16-18 -0.0002 0.1320 0.2711 -1.5407 -0.1439 -0.0782 0.3019 1.2388 1.8426 
 (-0.3395) (1.2612) (1.6259) (-14.1543) (-1.7980) (-1.0247) (2.0911)   
Panel B: IBOV 
FULL -0.0014 0.0182 0.0924 -0.6399 -0.0286 0.0439 0.1259 0.5141 0.7658 
 (-2.9530) (0.6685) (3.8774) (-10.1428) (-0.9728) (1.2797) (3.1362)   
07-08 0.0000 -0.0262 0.1683 -0.5450 -0.0202 0.0079 0.0379 0.5071 0.5829 
 (-0.0200) (-0.6428) (3.4368) (-10.8693) (-0.6342) (0.2666) (0.4977)   
08-10 -0.0024 -0.0029 0.1164 -0.8761 -0.0180 0.0545 0.1599 0.7163 1.0360 
 (-1.8589) (-0.0750) (3.1690) (-11.9560) (-0.3048) (0.9231) (2.3158)   
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10-12 -0.0031 -0.0788 0.1896 -0.9592 -0.0017 0.0254 0.2988 0.6605 1.2580 
 (-3.3611) (-0.5816) (1.7443) (-7.6017) (-0.0239) (0.5402) (3.7937)   
12-16 -0.0012 0.0607 -0.0270 -0.3356 -0.0496 0.0055 0.0985 0.2371 0.4341 
 (-2.2653) (2.2593) (-0.9669) (-6.5627) (-1.5129) (0.1554) (1.8625)   
16-18 0.0005 0.0391 0.0919 -0.3261 -0.1043 0.0922 -0.0314 0.3575 0.2946 
 (0.5916) (0.8788) (1.2945) (-4.1770) (-1.3678) (1.8984) (-0.3096)   
Panel C: IMOEX 
FULL -0.0011 0.0028 0.0371 -0.2831 -0.1663 -0.0120 0.0972 0.1859 0.3803 
 (-2.9838) (0.1116) (1.6513) (-7.5418) (-4.6826) (-0.3487) (3.1047)   
07-08 -0.0001 0.0197 0.0491 -0.1578 -0.2159 -0.0044 0.0106 0.1471 0.1684 
 (-0.0727) (0.5811) (1.3867) (-4.6218) (-4.5297) (-0.0766) (0.2160)   
08-10 -0.0036 0.0041 0.0376 -0.2743 -0.1794 0.0091 0.1476 0.1268 0.4219 
 (-2.7618) (0.0761) (0.9363) (-4.7738) (-3.1390) (0.1673) (3.0925)   
10-12 -0.0013 -0.0106 0.1464 -0.6360 0.0153 -0.1858 0.1286 0.5075 0.7646 
 (-0.6240) (-0.1701) (1.6543) (-4.8420) (0.1793) (-1.5744) (0.6242)   
12-16 -0.0006 -0.0223 0.0018 -0.2541 -0.1293 0.0022 0.0651 0.1890 0.3193 
 (-1.2840) (-0.9328) (0.0600) (-5.7642) (-3.8487) (0.0629) (1.5169)   
16-18 0.0000 0.1354 0.0366 -0.2623 -0.2323 -0.0026 0.0193 0.2430 0.2815 
 (0.0285) (2.5762) (0.3455) (-2.7051) (-2.5732) (-0.0421) (0.1766)   
Panel D: BSESN 
FULL -0.0014 0.0171 0.1188 -0.3749 -0.2749 -0.0023 0.1669 0.2081 0.5418 
 (-3.4434) (0.4032) (2.5724) (-4.4882) (-7.3987) (-0.0692) (3.8909)   
07-08 -0.0001 -0.1081 0.1504 -0.0294 -0.3212 -0.0040 0.0327 0.0032 0.0621 
 (-0.1372) (-2.1601) (3.0902) (-0.8341) (-6.8663) (-0.0932) (0.6723)   
08-10 -0.0034 0.0432 0.1148 -0.6242 -0.2118 0.0116 0.2415 0.3827 0.8657 
 (-2.3024) (0.5660) (1.0616) (-4.8832) (-2.9098) (0.1405) (2.7159)   
10-12 -0.0033 0.0071 0.1384 -0.2601 -0.3762 -0.0602 0.3319 0.0717 0.5920 
 (-2.2631) (0.0956) (1.7779) (-2.9870) (-3.6185) (-0.6583) (2.0177)   
12-16 -0.0019 0.0722 0.0979 -0.4012 -0.2684 -0.0843 0.2927 0.1084 0.6939 
 (-2.2772) (1.4309) (2.2187) (-4.9999) (-4.2049) (-1.7562) (2.3341)   
16-18 -0.0005 0.0459 0.1116 -0.3309 -0.3975 0.1237 0.1674 0.1634 0.4983 
 (-0.4128) (0.5383) (1.0538) (-1.6956) (-3.1035) (0.8398) (0.6954)   
Panel E: SHSEC 
FULL -0.0010 0.0242 0.0365 -0.0904 -0.1751 -0.0075 0.0973 0.0068 0.1877 
 (-2.6062) (0.8858) (1.3466) (-2.2669) (-4.9027) (-0.2586) (2.7292)   
07-08 -0.0005 -0.0189 0.0226 -0.0001 -0.0998 -0.0292 0.0368 0.0368 0.0369 
 (-0.4463) (-0.8191) (0.7957) (-0.0021) (-2.6227) (-0.8665) (0.6984)   
08-10 -0.0026 0.0353 0.1049 -0.1860 -0.2727 0.1247 0.1892 0.0032 0.3752 
 (-1.5749) (0.3467) (1.2661) (-1.4883) (-4.3338) (1.4386) (1.8099)   
10-12 -0.0043 0.0157 0.0266 -0.1539 -0.3355 -0.0975 0.4594 0.3055 0.6132 
 (-2.6926) (0.2452) (0.3782) (-1.5162) (-4.4235) (-1.3286) (2.4252)   
12-16 -0.0007 0.0526 0.0151 -0.0975 -0.1383 -0.0497 0.0682 0.0293 0.1656 
 (-1.3727) (1.4029) (0.3973) (-2.6224) (-1.9281) (-0.9616) (1.3073)   
16-18 -0.0006 0.0776 -0.0963 -0.1409 -0.2207 -0.0243 0.1743 0.0334 0.3152 
 (-0.7503) (0.7608) (-0.8938) (-1.1495) (-1.6011) (-0.2743) (1.0327)   
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We first analyze the results for the US market. In all the periods, our findings are 
aligned to those already discussed in the literature: VIX is a fear gauge because all the 
estimated contemporaneous parameters are strongly negative. However, putting a 
magnifying lens on the results related to the 2008 financial crisis gives unexpected 
outcomes: pre-crisis parameter (−1.12) is higher than during the crisis (−1.17); 
however, the parameter value after the crisis is surprisingly lower: (−1.38) during the 
period 2010-12; (−1.34) during 2012-2016 and even lower (−1.54) during 2016-2018, 
with the lowest value of all, in contrast with correlation results. 
For what is concerning the market sentiment ?̂?|𝑆𝑃𝑋|,𝑡 in Column 8, the estimated 
coefficient underlines a positive relationship between the size of a daily stock market 
move and the contemporaneous daily change in VIX, for all the examined periods, 
including the full one. This effect is enhanced since 2008 onwards. 
To conclude, the last two columns on the right-hand side of Table 6 list the absolute 
values of  ?̂?𝑠=𝑆𝑃𝑋
−  and ?̂?𝑠=𝑆𝑃𝑋
+  , i.e. the response to negative and positive returns index, 
respectively. For the full sample, we found negative asymmetry. The asymmetry in 
response is boosted after the 2008 crisis onwards. Surprisingly, the largest values are 
during the “low-volatility” period (2016-2018), with a more than doubled response to 
negative daily index returns.  
The relevance of the results is fostered when compared to similar studies run in the 
past. In fact, starting from the full sample, the contemporaneous value of (-1.25) 
emphasizes a stronger impact of the VIX over the US stock market: (Fleming et al., 
1995) found a value of -0.75 for the period 1986-1992 and (Sarwar, 2012b), who 
examined the period 1993-2007, found a contemporaneous effect of (−0.89). We can 
then conclude that the impact of VIX on the SPX has increased in the last decade, 
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especially during and after the 2008 financial crisis. The same conclusion applies to the 
size parameter and the asymmetric response to negative stock index returns: they are 
both higher since 2008, and especially during the recent period of “low-volatility” 
(2016-2018). Moving to BRIC markets, the VIX has a weaker effect on them than as 
described for the SPX. In fact, looking at the results for the full sample, the IBOV has 
a contemporaneous coefficient ?̂?𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑉,𝑡 almost twice higher than the SPX (−0.64 for the 
IBOV versus −1.25 for the SPX); the BSESN values is almost three times higher 
(−0.37); the IMOEX four times higher (−0.28); and the SHSEC almost twelve times 
higher (−0.08). The most relevant ties with the VIX are at lead 1, with the only 
exception of IBOV, but always smaller than those observed for SPX. We can therefore 
reasonably argue that among the BRIC stock indexes the IBOV is the most influenced 
by the VIX at contemporaneous time, while the others are ex post conditioned at lead 
1 in an equivalent way. Although these values are not as high as for the SPX, however, 
they are all negative and significant hence highlight the VIX fear gauge role played for 
all the BRIC stock indexes. Moreover, the hypothesis that the fear gauge effect is 
maintained through next period returns (as can be seen by looking at lead +1 
parameters) is supported for Russia, China and India: their ?̂?𝑠,𝑡+1 coefficients are 
generally equal or higher in absolute terms than corresponding ?̂?𝑠,𝑡, so that they carry 
on cross-market effects. Besides, ?̂?|𝑠|,𝑡  is positive; this leads to an asymmetric response 
of VIX to BRIC stock market indexes although estimated values are not as high as in 
the SPX case). 
Looking at the effects on the sub-samples, results are controversial. In fact, the 
observation drawn for the SPX about the impact of 2008 financial crisis are now valid 
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only for IMOEX, with the strongest relationship in the more recent period (2016-2018). 
On the other hand, for the IBOV and the SHSEC the strongest ties with the VIX are 
during 2008-2010. In the case of BSESN, the relationship peaked straight after the crisis 
(2010-2012). All the cited indexes show a mean-reverting behavior after 2010 which 
has been broken after 2016. Indeed, for sub-samples we have an asymmetrically 
negative response of VIX to BRIC stock market indexes. 
Comparing our results with (Sarwar, 2012b), we can therefore confirm the fear 
gauge role for all BRIC markets, including Russia. Indeed, in the case of Russia we 
cannot make a direct comparison with the findings of Sarwar using a different stock 
market index. Moreover, our results highlight that the VIX effect is more pronounced: 
during the period 1993-2007, Sarwar found the following coefficients for the 
contemporaneous and the lead t+1 parameters, respectively: (-0.02) and (0.007), for 
SHSEC; (-0.009) and (-0.009) for BSESN; (-0.030) and (0.009) for IBOV. These 
outcomes are perfectly in line with our findings which underlined an enhancement of 
ties during and after the 2008 financial crisis. 
In conclusion, the VIX is a strong fear gauge for the US market not only during crisis 
but even after those critical events: this relationship maintains strong also in low 
volatile timeframes, as demonstrated by analyzing the 2016-2018 period. This 
strengthen the fear gauge role of the VIX, which is no more bounded to high volatility 
periods but rather extended towards low-volatility phases. At the same time, the VIX 
revealed being a strong fear gauge also for the BRIC stock market indexes. This effect 
is strictly linked with the overlapping amplitude in trading hours: in the case of IBOV, 
where the overlap is higher, the fear effect is stronger, and it is more pronounced for 
the contemporaneous coefficient. For China, India and Russia, the effect is evident both 
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in the contemporaneous and in the lead t+1 coefficients. With the exception of IBOV, 
which behaves as the SPX, the BRIC indexes show a peak in their relationship with 
VIX during the 2008 financial crisis to decrease thereafter. In addition, for all the 
markets under consideration, we found strong presence of asymmetric responses to 
negative market returns. 
5 Conclusion 
We investigated the relationships between the CBOE VIX volatility index and the US 
and BRIC market indexes, with the aim of verifying to which extent the VIX can be 
still considered a fear gauge for them. In detail, following the work of (Sarwar, 2012b), 
we picked up the analysis from the point he left off, focusing on the time window from 
Jan 2007 to Feb 2018, to capture the relations before, during and after the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
Starting from a rigorous statistical analysis of the VIX and changes in VIX time 
series, we were able to identify four structural breaks in the VIX and consequently to 
split the whole sample into five regimes. This enhanced the capability of the 
multivariate regression model suggested in (Fleming et al., 1995) in estimating the 
relationships between VIX and the US and BRIC stock markets. In fact, the statistical 
analysis highlighted how during the period Jan 2007 – Feb 2018 the VIX has reached 
extreme values, thus indicating the greater uncertainty among investors. This 
uncertainty was captured by the regression model: the VIX has never been such a strong 
fear gauge for US market than during and after the 2008 financial crisis. Empirical 
evidence confirms the asymmetry response to negative returns and shows that the role 
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of VIX for the US is tougher than as highlighted in previous works such as (Fleming et 
al., 1995) and (Sarwar, 2012b) and that even in low volatile periods, like during the 
biennium 2016 –2018, the VIX promptly reacted to market drawdowns.  
Regarding to BRIC markets, our findings are aligned to those in (Sarwar, 2012b), as 
we are able to state that the VIX is a fear gauge especially for the Brazilian IBOV, and 
in a more limited way for the Chinese SHSEC and the Indian BSESN. Contradicting 
Sarwar’s findings, VIX is also a fear gauge for the Russian IMOEX. Overlapping in 
trading hours played a decisive role in the fear transmission: this explains why IBOV 
(which has six trading hours overlapping with VIX) has in average a 30% stronger 
reaction to VIX changes than BSESN, SHSEC and IMOEX. Moreover, VIX fear 
transmission mechanism worked towards BRIC markets mostly during the 2008 
financial crisis 2008-2010 and in the post-crisis period (2010-2012). After 2012, the 
relationships weakened to revert to pre-crisis values. This applies for all BRIC markets 
with the exception of IBOV, where we underlined a strengthening of the relation with 
VIX even after 2008, in line with the US market. The asymmetry in response to negative 
returns is confirmed for all the BRIC countries. 
In conclusion, the 2008 financial crisis exacerbated the VIX fear gauge role for the 
US and also for the BRIC markets. These effects remain strong for the US even in the 
latest years where the VIX reached the lowest values in its history. On the other hand, 
the relationships went back to pre-crisis level for the BRIC indexes until the 2016-2018 
period. In addition, our work also supports findings in previous about the relationships 
between VIX and BRIC markets, thus consecrating the role of VIX as fear gauge for 
Brazil, China and India and also Russia.  
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